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We derive an analogue of the quantum total probability rule by constructing a probability theory
based on paraconsistent logic. Bayesian probability theory is constructed upon classical logic and
a desiderata, that is, a set of desired properties that the theory must obey. We construct a new
probability theory following the desiderata of Bayesian probability theory but replacing the classical
logic by paraconsistent logic. This class of logic has been conceived to handle eventual inconsistencies
or contradictions among logical propositions without leading to the trivialisation of the theory.
Within this Paraconsistent bayesian probability theory it is possible to deduce a new total probability
rule which depends on the probabilities assigned to the inconsistencies. Certain assignments of values
for these probabilities lead to expressions identical to those of Quantum mechanics, in particular
to the quantum total probability rule obtained via symmetric informationally complete positive-
operator valued measure.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Wj, 03.67.-a
According to the bayesian approach, probability theory
is an extension of logic [1]. Probabilities are a measure,
assigned by an agent to the plausibility of a proposition
conditional on the truth of a priori information [2]. In the
limit of complete knowledge, when probabilities achieve
extremal values, the rules for handling probabilities be-
come those of deductive classical logic.
Bayesian probability theory (BPT) has been success-
fully applied in a wide range of research areas such as for
instance genetics [3] and cosmology [4]. In spite of this,
there are phenomena which are beyond the scope of BPT.
A noteworthy example is Quantum mechanics, where
probabilities do not follow, in general, the total prob-
ability rule of BPT. Quantum states can be expressed as
convex combinations of operators, in a symmetrically in-
formationally complete-positive operator valued measure
(SIC-POVM), weighted by probabilities. This represen-
tation, together with Born’s rule, allows us to calculate
the probability of the outcomes associated to any other
positive operator-valued measure (POVM), which leads
to the quantum total probability rule. This turns out to
be related to the total probability rule of BPT through
rescaling and translation operations.
Arises thus naturally the question whether we can
modify BPT in such a way that it provides us a new
total probability rule which encompasses as particular
cases the total probability rule of BPT and its quantum
counterpart. Here, we attempt to answer this question
by constructing a probability theory based on paracon-
sistent logic. Paraconsistent logics [5–7] are designed to
handle theories in which inconsistencies or contradictions
might arise without leading to a trivialisation or logi-
cal explosion. Thereby, this new Paraconsistent bayesian
probability theory (PBPT) requires the assignation of
probabilities to the occurrence of contradictions. These
enter in the new total probability rule and, depending on
their values, it is possible to recover the total probability
rule of BPT and its quantum version. Let us note that we
do not seek a new interpretation of Quantum mechanics,
but a new probability theory upon which we can build
Quantum mechanics.
In BPT the basic product and sum rules for combining
probabilities are given by
P (A,B|I) = P (A|I)P (B|A, I) = P (B|I)P (A|B, I) (1)
and
P (A|I) + P (A¯|I) = 1, (2)
respectively. Symbols A, B and I represent propositions
asserting that something is true and a bar over a propo-
sition indicates its logical negation. A proposition to the
right of a vertical bar is assumed to be true and a comma
separating two propositions indicates the logical conjunc-
tion. Sum of two propositions indicates the logical dis-
junction. Thus P (A|B, I) means the probability that A
is true conditional on the truth of both B and I. Bayes
rule follows by rearranging the two terms at the right
hand side of the product rule, that is
P (B|A, I) =
P (B|I)P (A|B, I)
P (A|I)
. (3)
The total probability rule, which follows from a marginal-
isation process over a set of complete, mutually exclusive
propositions {Ai}, is given by
P (B|I) =
∑
i
P (Ai|I)P (B|Ai, I). (4)
2Sum and product rules can be deduced from classical
logic by means of a desiderata [1], that is, a set of desir-
able properties that a theory for plausible reasoning or
inference should satisfy. In this regard, the desiderata
does not assert anything to be true. The desiderata is:
(i) degrees of plausibility are represented by real num-
bers, (ii) as new information supporting the truth of a
proposition is supplied, the number which represents the
plausibility will increase continuously and monotonically
and achieve the deductive limit where appropriate, (iiia)
if a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way,
every possible way must lead to the same result (struc-
tural consistency), (iiib) the theory must take account
of all information, provided it is relevant to the ques-
tion (propriety), and (iiic) equivalent states of knowl-
edge must be represented by equivalent plausibility as-
signments (Jaynes consistency).
In order to construct the PBPT we choose to maintain
the desiderata but change the underlaying logic. Instead
of basing our construction on classical logic we resort to
a paraconsistent logic, in particular the C1 propositional
calculus [8]. Paraconsistent logics are logics in which the-
ories can be inconsistent but non-trivial. A trivial theory
is one, such that everything expressed in its language can
be proved. In classical logic, any inconsistency entails
triviality, that is: (A, A¯) ⊢ B ( where ⊢ indicates syntac-
tic consequence or formal deduction) for any formulas A
and B, which is not true in paraconsistent logics.
A theory T, whose underlying logic is L and whose
language is L, is inconsistent if there is a formula α (an
admisible expression of its language ) such that both α
and α¯ are theorems (formulas deduced from the axioms
of the theory by means of its rules of inference) of T,
otherwise T is consistent. An expression of the form α, α¯
is called contradiction. T is trivial if all formulas of L
are theorems of T; otherwise, T is non-trivial. The logic
L is paraconsistent if it can be the underlying logic of
inconsistent but non-trivial theories. The propositional
calculus C1 contains the usual connectives: implication
(α → β), conjunction (α, β), disjunction (α + β) and
negation (α¯).
Two important properties of C1 are: (i) in general,
the principle of non-contradiction does not hold, and (ii)
from two contradictory propositions, that is one being
the negation of the other, it is not possible to deduce any
arbitrary third proposition. This latter property ensures
that the presence of contradictions by no means entail the
trivialisation of the theory. Within C1 we define the non-
contradictoriness of a proposition α by αo = α, α¯. If αo
is true then for α holds the principle of non-contradiction
and we said that α is non-contradictory. Otherwise we
say that α is contradictory. The proposition αo is called
the contradictoriness of α. Other important definition is
the strong negation of α by α¯∗ = α¯, αo. Two important
results follow from these definitions: (a) for any α we
have that ⊢ (αo)o (Arruda’s theorem [8]) and (b) for any
α and β the connectives α→ β, α+β, α¯∗ and α, β satisfy
all schemas and inference rules of classical propositional
calculus.
Le us now construct the PBPT. We will keep the
desiderata used to construct BPT. However, for the
desiderata (ii) the deductive limit is that of the valid
schemas of C1-logic, which is the same as the classical
logic when the statements are non-contradictory. We
must also consider that the contradictoriness of a state-
ment is a new relevant information for the plausibility of
the statement. In BPT the product rule is deduced [9]
by analysing all possible functional forms for the proba-
bility. All but one of these are demonstrated to be inade-
quate by studying several particular cases such as A = B,
I = A, I = A¯, etc. These particular cases are included in
C1-logic, provided that the contradictoriness of the state-
ment is a relevant information. Thus, by desiderata (iiib)
a proposition like I = A¯ should read as I = A¯, I or
I = A¯, Ao or I = A¯, Ao and the last one rules out the
same functional form as I = A¯. Since the deduction of
the product rule Eq. (1) does not involve any particu-
lar schema (only properties of the connectives, like the
symmetry of conjunction) it aso holds for C1-logic.
For any non-contradictory formula in C1 all schemas
from classical logic are also valid. Thus, the results of
BPT are also valid for these. Consequently, we have
P (A|Ao, I) + P (A¯|Ao, I) = 1. (5)
Following (a) we have that any formula’s non-
contradictoriness is always non-contradictory. Thus
P (Ao|I) + P (Ao|I) = 1, (6)
and according to (b) we have for the strong negation that
P (A|I ′) + P (A¯∗|I ′) = 1. (7)
We can now deduce the sum rule of PBPT. Let us start
with Eq. (5) and multiply it by P (Ao|I), that is,
P (Ao|I)P (A|Ao, I) + P (Ao|I)P (A¯|Ao, I) = P (Ao|I).
(8)
Making use of the product rule Eq. (1) we obtain
P (A|I)P (Ao|A, I) + P (A¯|I)P (Ao|A¯, I) = P (Ao|I). (9)
Using Eq. (6) and the product rule the previous expres-
sion becomes
P (A|I)+P (A¯|I)−P (Ao, A|I)−P (Ao, A¯|I) = 1−P (Ao|I).
(10)
Considering that by the definition of contradictoriness we
have Ao, A = Ao and Ao, A¯ = Ao we finally obtain the
sum rule of PBPT
P (A|I) + P (A¯|I)− P (Ao|I) = 1. (11)
Clearly, the PBPT sum rule, not only involves a propo-
sition and its negation, but also its contradictoriness. In
3general P (Ao) does not vanish and thus P (A) 6= 1−P (A¯).
Furthermore, the probability of a contradiction works as
a negative probability when thinking about it as an state-
ment itself. Consequently, the addition of P (A|I) and
P (A¯|I) might be larger than one. In particular, when
we known with certainty that A is contradictory, that is,
P (Ao) = 1, then the sum rule demands the assignment
P (A) = 1 = P (A¯).
From Eq. (7) and using Eq. (6) together with prod-
uct and sum rules Eqs. (1) and (11) we can deduce the
extended sum rule which involves the probability of the
disjunction of propositions A and B, that is,
P (A+B|I) = P (A|I) + P (B|I)− P (A,B|I). (12)
This is the same rule as in the case of BPT.
When analysing the probability of an statement, such
as A, we can also reason based on the knowledge about
their non-contradictory or contradictory parts, that is,
on A˜ = A,Ao or A,Ao, respectively. The propriety
desiderata (iiib) demands that this information must
play a relevant role in the assignment of probability.
Since A,Ao = Ao, a reasoning based on the contradic-
tory part never reaches the deductive classical limit (i.e.
I = Ao, I), thus desiderata (iiib) suggests us to consider
the non-contradictoriness of our data. For instance, we
can deduce the probability P (A˜ + B˜|I) for the conjunc-
tion of the mutually exclusive non-contradictory parts of
A and B, that is when the proposition A,Ao, B,Bo does
not hold. Under this condition the extended sum rule
Eq. (12) leads to
P (A˜+ B˜|I) = P (A˜|I) + P (B˜|I), (13)
which with the product rule becomes
P (A˜+ B˜|I) = P (A|I)P (Ao|A, I)
+ P (B|I)P (Bo|B, I). (14)
Eq. (6) allows us to transform the terms involving
the non-contradictoriness in the previous expression into
terms involving the contradictoriness, that is
P (A˜+ B˜|I) = P (A|I)[1− P (Ao|A, I)]
+ P (B|I)[1− P (Bo|B, I)]. (15)
Employing once again the product rule and A,Ao = Ao
and B,Bo = Bo we finally obtain the expression
P (A˜+ B˜|I) = P (A|I) + P (B|I)
− [P (Ao|I) + P (Bo|I)]. (16)
Thus, the extended sum rule for two mutually exclusive
non-contradictory parts turns out to be fundamentally
different to Eq. (12). The last term in Eq. (16) corre-
sponds to the negative of the total probability that the
statements are contradictory. Equivalently, when consid-
ering the sum rule of PBPT Eq. (16) becomes
P (A˜+ B˜|I) = 2− P (A¯|I)− P (B¯|I). (17)
Eq. (16) can be easily extended to the conjunction of
N propositions Ak (with k = 1, . . . , N) with mutually
exclusive non-contradictory parts, that is,
P (
∑
k
A˜k|I) =
∑
k
P (Ak|I)−
∑
k
P (Aok|I). (18)
This later result allows us to calculate the probability of
the conjunction between propositions B and
∑
k A˜k. The
product rules leads us to
P (B|
∑
k
A˜k, I)P (
∑
k
A˜k|I) = P (B,
∑
k
A˜k|I), (19)
which when combined with Eq. (18) leads to
P (B|
∑
k
A˜kI) =
P (B,
∑
k A˜k|I)∑
k[P (Ak|I)− P (A
o
k|I)]
. (20)
Using Eq. (13) we obtain
P (B|
∑
k
A˜k, I) =
∑
k P (A˜k|I)P (B|A˜k, I)∑
k[P (Ak|I)− P (A
o
k|I)]
. (21)
Decomposing a proposition Ak into its contradictory and
non-contradictory parts we have Ak = A˜k + Ak, Aok, or
equivalently Ak = A˜k+Aok. Using the extended sum rule
Eq. (12) we obtain
P (Ak|I) = P (A˜k|I) + P (Aok|I)− P (A˜k, A
o
k|I). (22)
The last term vanishes since proposition Aok is non-
contradictory. Thereby, we have
P (Ak|I) = P (A˜k|I) + P (Aok|I). (23)
This result allows us to cast Eq. (21) as
P (B|
∑
k
A˜k, I) =
∑
k P (Ak|I)P (B|A˜k, I)∑
k[P (Ak|I)− P (A
o
k|I)]
−
∑
k P (A
o
k|I)P (B|A˜k, I)∑
k[P (Ak|I)− P (A
o
k|I)]
, (24)
which is the total probability rule of PBPT. Let us now
consider the propositions Ak to be non-contradictory,
that is, our a priori information is I = Ao1, A
o
2, . . . , A
o
N , I.
Since propositions {A˜k} are mutually exclusive, we also
have that propositions {Ak} are mutually exclusive. As-
suming the completeness of the set {Ak} we have that
P (
∑
k Ak|I) = 1 =
∑
k P (Ak|I). Thereby, the second
term at the right hand side of Eq. (24) vanishes and the
denominator becomes 1. We obtain
P (B|
∑
k
Ak, I) =
∑
k
P (Ak|I)P (B|Ak, I). (25)
Thus, the total probability rule of BPT given by Eq.
(4) is contained within PBPT. Total probability rule
4of PBPT Eq. (24) also allows to calculate probabili-
ties P (B|
∑
k A˜k, I) and P (B
o|
∑
k A˜k, I), which together
with probability P (B|
∑
k A˜k, I) also obey the sume rule
Eq. (11).
In order to obtain the total probability rule of BPT
we assumed the non-contradictoriness of propositions
{Ak}. We can now show that the total probability rule
Eq. (24) contains the quantum total probability rule for
a set of propositions endowed with a particular struc-
ture of contradictoriness. Let us first briefly review the
quantum total probability rule. Quantum states of a d-
dimensional quantum system are described by unit-trace
positive semidefinite linear operators ρ which act onto
the Hilbert space Hd. States can also be described by a
collection of probabilities with the help of a SIC-POVM
[10]. This is composed of d2 subnormalised rank one pro-
jectors {Πk/d} with Hilbert-Schmidt products given by
Tr(ΠkΠl) = (dδk,l+1)/(d+1). These operators generate
the representation for quantum states
ρ =
d+ 1
d
d2−1∑
k=0
Q(Πk|I)Πk −
1
d
d2−1∑
k=0
Πk, (26)
where Q(Πk|I) = Tr(Πkρ) is Born’s rule [11]. This set
of probabilities contains all the information about the
system required to predict the outcomes of possible ex-
periments. Using this representation for quantum states
we can calculate the transition probability associated to
any other state Σ, that is
Q(Σ|ρ) =
d+ 1
d
d2−1∑
k=0
Q(Πk|I)Q(Σ|Πk)
−
1
d
∑
k
Q(Σ|Πk). (27)
This expression is the quantum total probability rule and
allows us to predict the transition probability to another
state Σ from our knowledge of the initial state of the
system, given by the sets of probabilities {Q(Πk|I)}, and
the probabilities {Q(Σ|Πk)}. In this regard, the quantum
total probability rule is equivalent to Born’s rule [12].
Quantum and paraconsistent total probability rules
contain the subtraction of two non-negative terms be-
ing one of them a constant. With the introduction of
a particular set of propositions, which emulates certain
properties of a SIC-POVM, we can deduce a paraconsis-
tent total probability rule that exhibits a stronger simi-
larity with the quantum total probability rule. From Eq.
(23) we have
∑
i
P (Ai|I) =
∑
i
P (A˜i|I) +
∑
i
P (Aoi |I). (28)
We also have that
P (
∑
i
Ai|I) = 1 = P (
∑
i
A˜i +
∑
i
Aoi |I). (29)
We now assume that propositions Ak are all simultane-
ously contradictory or non-contradictory. In this case we
require a single proposition to signal this property, that
is Ao1 = A
o
2 = · · · = A
o
N = A
o. Thereby, we have that
P (
∑
i A˜i+A
o|I) = 1, which with the help of the extended
sum rule Eq. (12) leads to
∑
i
P (A˜i|I) + P (Ao|I) = 1. (30)
Inserting Eq. (30) into Eq. (28) we obtain
P (Ao|I) =
1
N − 1
∑
i
P (Ai|I)−
1
N − 1
. (31)
This latter equation allows us to write Eq. (24) in the
form
P (B|
∑
k
A˜k, I) =
N − 1
N − S(I)
∑
k
P (Ak|I)P (B|A˜k, I)
−
S(I)− 1
N − S(I)
∑
k
P (B|A˜k, I), (32)
with S(I) =
∑
k P (Ak|I). We can now link both total
probability rules Eqs. (32) and (27). In our model of
propositions we now make the number of propositions
equal to the number of elements in the SIC-POVM, that
is N = d2, and assign the value
∑
i P (Ai|I) = d. Enter-
ing these values in Eq. (32) we obtain the expression
P (B|
d2−1∑
k=0
A˜k, I) =
d+ 1
d
d2−1∑
k=0
P (Ak|I)P (B|A˜k, I)
−
1
d
d2−1∑
k=0
P (B|A˜k, I). (33)
The similarity between total probability rules Eqs. (27)
and (33) is striking. In Quantum mechanics the set
{Q(Πk|I)} provides all the information needed to asso-
ciate the system to a unique quantum state ρ through
Eq. (26). In PBPT the set {P (Ak|I)} represents our
state of knowledge about the truth values of the set {Ak}
of complete, possibly contradictory, and mutually exclu-
sive propositions. In Quantum mechanics the quantities
{Q(Σ|Πk)} represent the probabilities of projecting onto
state Σ provided that we know with certainty that the
system is described by the state Πk. This set charac-
terises the state Σ with respect to the members of the
SIC-POVM. In PBPT the set {P (B|A˜k, I)} has an anal-
ogous meaning, it describes the probabilities for the truth
of proposition B given that each proposition Ak is consid-
ered to be true and non-contradictory. These probabili-
ties summarise our knowledge about proposition B given
our knowledge about propositions {Ak}. If we now chose
to assign the values ofQ(Πk|I) andQ(Σ|Πk) to the values
of P (Ak|I) and P (B|A˜k, I) respectively, then both rules
Eqs. (27) and (33) lead to the same prediction for the
5value of the probabilities Q(Σ|ρ) and P (B|
∑d2−1
k=0 A˜k, I).
We have thus now two theories, Quantum mechanics and
Paraconsistent bayesian probability theory, with differ-
ences in their origins and formalisms. Yet, with the
proper identifications, these lead to the same predictions.
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in
determining whether other theories might exhibit prop-
erties considered to be hallmarks of Quantum mechanics
such as for instance interference, entanglement and in-
compatible measurements; this in the hope that Quan-
tum mechanics can be deduced from these more general
theories with the help of a suitable set of physically mo-
tivated constraints. For example, Spekken’s toy model
[13, 14] was constructed upon the knowledge balance
principle. Although the model has many properties in
common with Quantum mechanics, this does not emerge
as a particular case of it. Generalised probabilistic theo-
ries [15] are based on a set of seven assumptions which al-
low to construct states and operations for composite sys-
tems which include those of Quantum mechanics. Here,
we have introduced a new theory of probability based
on the sole premise that its underlying logic must ac-
count for the possibility of contradictions. Thus, PBPT
is a quantitative formulation of how to make rational de-
cisions in presence of uncertainties and contradictions.
This new theory is clearly of epistemological character,
it says more about our believes on the plausibility of na-
ture’s behaviour than about nature itself, that is, PBPT
does not describe the physical reality, it rather provides
a set of rules, or algorithm, to calculate probabilities of
certain propositions. Whether these propositions are of
ontological or epistemological character cannot be de-
cided within PBPT. In absence of contradictions PBPT
reduces to BPT. Within PBPT and at hand of a sim-
ple model of propositions we deduced a total probability
rule which agrees in form and meaning with the quan-
tum mechanical one. This is remarkable, since we have
only demanded a change of the underlying logic without
resorting to any conception about physical reality. Nev-
ertheless, this principle is not enough to single out a space
state which agrees with the quantum mechanical one. In
the case of Quantum mechanics operators representing
states must be positive semidefinite, which imposes d− 1
constraints in the set of probabilities Q(Πk|I). These
constraints do not arise within PBPT and thus additional
principles are required.
Within the model of propositions leading to Eq. (33)
we obtain that the probability of a contradiction is given
by P (Ao|I) = 1/(d+1). This value equals the inner prod-
uct among different members of the SIC-POVM, that
is, Tr(ΠkΠl) = 1/(d + 1). The relationship between
nonorthogonality of quantum states and emergence of
logical contradictions was noted by Birkhoff and von Neu-
mann [16]. In order to solve the difficulties posed by
these contradictions they proposed to change the rules of
classical logic by modifying the distributive identities of
disjunction and conjunction. In our approach we do not
attempt to eliminate logical contradictions but incorpo-
rate them into the formalism by means of paraconsistent
logic, in particular the propositional calculus C1. This
choice is motivated by simplicity. Within this calculus
all schemas and inference rules of classical propositional
calculus are valid when replacing the negation by the
strong negation and the consistency of the contradictori-
ness of any proposition always holds. These elements also
appear in other propositional calculi, such as for exam-
ple Paraconsistent Boolean algebra, and thus our results
might hold for other paraconsistent logics.
Finally, we would like to mention that the connection
between Quantum mechanics and Paraconsistent logic
has been mentioned in the literature. In particular, this
has been studied in the context of the superposition prin-
ciple [17] and quantum computing [18]. Application of
PBPT to the problem of inconsistent data basis is also
feasible.
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